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[So F. No. 22261. In Bank. Nov. 10, 1967.] 
DANIEL GORHAM WHEALTON, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
V. HAZEL LORRAINE WHEALTON, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
[1] Process-Service by Publication.-In an action for annulment 
of marriage, a defendant residing outside the state could be 
served by publication (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 412, 413), which wa.'J 
complete upon making personal service outside the state or at 
the expiration of the time prescribed' by the order of publica-
tion, whichever first occurred (Code Civ. Proc., § 413). 
[2a,2b] Judgments-Judgments by Defa.ult-Time for Entry.-In 
an action for annulment of marriage, entry of default and a 
default judgment entered only 16 days after the earliest date 
on which service by pUblication could be deemed completed 
were void, where a defendant served by publication had 30 
days after service was complete to appear and answer (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 407) and would not be in default until the ~xpira­
tion of that time. 
[S] Process-Service by Publication-Personal Service Without 
State.-Under Code Civ. Proc., § 413, providing that when 
publication of summons is ordered, personal service of a copy 
of the summons and complaint out of the state is equivalent to 
publication and deposit in the post office, receipt of a mailed 
summons by defendant out of the state is not personal service 
thereof, requirements of a personal service being strictly 
construed, and a mere showing that a party had notice in fact 
being insufficient to establisb such service. 
[4] Marriage-Annulment.-An annulment of marriage differ's 
conceptually from a divorce in that a divorce terminates a 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d Rev., Divorce, Separation and Annulment, 
§ 330; Am.Jur., Marriage (1st ed § 75). 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Process, Notices, and Papers, § 76; Am. Jur., 
Process (1st ed § 59). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Process, § 27; [2] Judgments, § 51; 
[3] Process, §51; [4,5,7,8] Marriage, §34; [6] Marriage, §§ 34, 
44; [9] Military, § 2.8(3). 
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legal status, whereas an annulment establishes that a marital 
status never existed. 
[6] Id.-Annulment-Jurisdiction.-In an action for annulment of 
marriage, due process concepts of fairness to defendant do not 
permit plaintiff to choose a forum inconvenient to defendant 
absent personal jurisdiction over defendant, and, although a 
rule that requires a party who is in California and who had 
been fraudulently induced into a marriage to travel to an 
inconvenient forum to obtain legal recognition of the nullity 
of that status works a hardship on that party, such a rule is 
essential to preclude a transient plaintiff from choosing a 
forum that would make defense difficult or impossible simply 
because of physical distance. 
[6] Id.-Annulment-Jurisdiction: Default Judgment.-In an ac-
tion for annulment of marriage, the court was without juris-
diction to enter a default judgment where the marriage cere-
mony took place elsewhere, defendant lived elsewhere, the 
matrimonial domicile was elsewhere, witnesses were likely to 
be located elsewhere, and, although domicile of a plaintiff 
would afford jurisdiction to award an ex parte annulment, 
plaintiff did not plead or prove that he was a domiciliary of 
California when the default judgment was entered. 
[7] Id.-Annulment-Jurisdiction.-The rule that domicile of at 
least one of the parties is a prerequisite to a: valid divorce does 
not apply to annulment actions, however valid the rationale for 
such prerequisite may be in divorce actions; in divorce actions, 
the applicable substantive law changes as parties change their 
domicile, but in annulment actions courts uniformly apply the 
law of the state in which the marriage was contracted, and 
the interests of the state of celebration of the marriage or the 
, state of domicile of either party do not preclude a court of a 
sister state having personal jurisdiction over both parties from 
entertaining an annulment action. 
[8] Id. - Annulment - Jurisdiction. - A California court having 
personal jurisdiction over both parties, could entertain an an-
nulment action where plaintiff, being in military service, was 
under a special disability in terms of access to any forum 
other than California, defendant was not caught inadvertently 
within California, and personal jurisdiction was not exercised 
on a territorial power theory but obtained over defendant 
through her consent, no undue burdens being placed on her by 
the trial of the action in California. 
[9] !4ilitary-Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act-Motion to Stay 
Proceedings.-In an annulment action in which plaintiff's re-
quest for a stay of proceedings on defendant's motion to set 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Divorce, Separation and Annulment, 
§ 328 ; Am.Jur., Marriage (1st ed § 60 et seq). 
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G58 WHEALTON V. WHEALTON [67 C.2d 
aside a default judgment was based on the Soldiers' and Sail-
or's Civil Relief Act of 1940, plaintiff's prosecution of the 
case at such stage was not materially affected by his military 
service so as to justify a stay where the grounds urged for 
setting aside the default judgment were that it was premature 
and that the California court was without jurisdiction; where 
plaintiff's military service in no way interfered with his ability 
to defend the judgment; where the facts were not in dispute 
and were a matter of first-hand knowledge to his attorney as 
well as to plaintiff; and where the disputed question was one of 
law that plaintiff's attorney could take charge of without 
plaintiff's presence. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Alvin E. Weinberger, 
Judge. Reversed. 
Action.to annul a marriage. Judgment for plaintiff reversed. 
John A. Bohn, Jr., for Defendant and Appellant. 
John E. Anderton and Helen B. Larson for Plaintiff and 
Respondent . 
I 
Wagener, Lynch, Curran & Minney and H. Ward Dawson 
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a default judg-
ment annulling her marriage to plaintiff on the ground of 
fraud. 
Plaintiff, a petty officer on active duty with the United 
States Navy, married defendant at Bel Air, Maryland, on 
June 15, 1964. Thereafter his military duties took him from 
place to place on the east coast until he was assigned to the 
U.S.S. Repose at the San Francisco Naval Shipyard. He ar-
rived in California on JUly 14, 1965. Plaintiff and defendant 
lived together for only six or seven weeks on the east coast. 
On September 3, 1965, plaintiff filed this action for annul-
ment of the marriage. Summons was issued and an order for 
publication of summons was flIed on the same day. Publica-
tion of the summons was accomplished as prescribed by law. 
Defendant received a copy of the summons by mail at her 
home in Maryland on September 7, 1965. On September 11, 
1965, she wrote the court that she was having difficulty ob-
taining legal counsel, but that she wished" it known that it is 
my earnest desire and intent to contest this complaint." On 
Nov. 1967] WHEALTON v. WIlEALTON 659 
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October 11, 1965, the court entered her default, heard testi-
mony in support of the complaint, and entered a judgment 
annulling the marriage. On October 19, 1965, defendant made 
a motion to set aside the default and the judgment by default 
and to permit the filing of an answer and a cross-complaint. 
The motion was denied on November 9,1965. 
[1] Defendant contends that the default judgment must 
be reversed on the grounds that it was prematurely entered 
and that the court did not have jurisdiction of the subject 
matter. 
Since defendant resides outside the state, the summons 
could be served by publication (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 412,413). 
"When publication is ordered, personal service of a copy of 
the summons and complaint out of the State is equivalent to 
pUblication and deposit in the post office. Service is complete 
upon the making of such personal service or at the expiration 
of the time prescribed by the order for publication, whichever 
event shall first occur." (Code Civ. Proc., § 413.) [2a] De-
fendant had 30 days after service was complete to appear 
and answer (Code Civ. Proc., § 407) and would not be in 
default until the expiration of that time (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 585, subd. 3; Foster v. Vehmeyer (1901) 133 Cal. 459, 460 
[65 P. 974] ; Grewell v. Henderson (1855) 5 Cal. 465, 466; 
Burt v. Scra;nton (1851) 1 Cal. 416, 417.) [3] Since she 
was not personally served 1 the 30-day period could not begin 
before September 25, 1965, the earliest date on which service 
of publication could be deemed completed. (See Code Civ. 
Proc., § 413; Gov. Code, § 6064.) [2b] The entry of default 
and the default judgment entered on October 11, 1965, only 
16 days later, are therefore void. 
Even if the default judgment were not premature, it would 
have to be reversed, for neither the pleadings nor the evidence 
establish that either party was a domiciliary of California. 
The court therefore lacked jurisdiction to award an ex parte 
annulment. 
In ex parte divorce actions, a bona fide domicile of at least 
one of the parties within the forum state is necessary for 
jurisdiction. (WiUiams v. North CaroVina (1945) 325 U.S. 
lReceipt of the mailed summons on September 7, 1965, was not per· 
sonal service. The requirements of a personal service are strictly con-
strued; a mere showing that a party had notice in fact is insufficient. 
(Lettenmaier v. Lettenmaier (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 837, 843-844 [22 
Cal.Rptr. 156]; Sternbeck v. Buck (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 829, 832 [307 
P.2d 970].) 
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226, 229,238 [89 L.Ed. 1577, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 157 A.L.R. 1366] ; 
Orouch v. Orouch (1946) 28 Ca1.2d 243, 249 [169 P.2d 897] ; 
see D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Oonflict of Laws; Si-
m01lS, Rosenstiel, and Bot'ax (1966) 34 U.ChLL.Rev. 26, 45; 
Developments-Jurisdiction (1960) 73 Harv.L.Rev. 909, 966; 
Rest., Conflict of Laws, § 111.) This rule reflects due. process 
considerations involved in adjudicating rights of an absent 
party in an inconvenient forum; it also reHects the interests 
of the several states in regulating the marital status of their 
domiciliaries and limits forum shopping for self-serving sub-
stantive divorce law. (See Williams v. North Oarolina, supra, 
325 U.S. 226, 229-230; Orouch v. Orouch, supra, 28 Cal.2d 243, 
251 ; see von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to A.djudicate : 
A. Suggested Analysis (1966) 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1121, 1130; 
Developments-Jurisdiction, supra, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 909, 967-
968, 973-974.) 
Civil Code section 128 implements this rule by requiring 
that at least one of the parties to an action for divorce be a 
resident of the state for a year before the action is com-
menced. (See also Civ. Code, § 128.1.) In this context the 
statutory terms "residence" and "domicile" are synony-
mous.2 (Haas v. Haas (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 615, 617 [38 
Cal.Rptr~ 811]; Ungemach v. Ungemach (1943) 61 Cal.App. 
2d 29, 36 [142 P.2d 99] ; see Smith, v. Smith (1955) 45 Cal.2d 
235,239 [288 P.2d 497].) 
In Millar v. Millar (1917) 175 Cal. 797, 807 [167 P. 394, 
Ann.Cas. 1918E 184, L.R.A. 1918B 415], this court held that 
the statutory residence requirement for divorce did not apply 
to annulment proceedings. In that case, however, since both 
parties were before the court and the marriage had been en-
tered into in California, the court had no occasion to and did 
not consider on what basis a state may constitutionally de-
clare void a marriage of prima facie va.lidity when one of the 
parties is not before the court. 
2A majority of the states use length of residence as a basis for juris-
diction. Equating domicile with residence should be unnecessary to ful1ill 
due process requirements. A reasonable length-of-residence test alone 
would obviate the necessity for an often spurious inquiry into intent and 
would demonstrate as clearly as domicile that the forum state has an 
interest in adjudicating the marital status. (See D. Currie, Suitoase 
Divcwoe in the Confliot of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Bcwa:£, supra, 
34 U.Chi.L.Rev. 26, 64; Powell, And Repent at Leisure (1945) 58 Harv. 
I ... Rev. 930, 1008-1010.) Several states have statutes permitting resident 
servicemen to obtain divorces without inquiry into domicile. These states 
apply their own law. (See Cheatham. Griswold, Reese and Rosenberg (5th 
ed. 1964) Cases On Conflict of Laws 855-856; Leflar, Conflict 0/ Law8 
and FMnilll Law (1960) 14 Ark.L.Rev. 47, 49·50.) 
) 
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Ex parte divorces are a striking exception to the rule that a 
court must have personal jurisdiction over a party before it 
may adjudicate his substantial rights. (See von Mehren & 
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 
supra, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1121, 1129-1130.) The legal fiction that 
explains the exception by regarding the marital status as a res 
present at the permanent home of either of the spouses pro-
vides doctrinal consistency with other rules governing juris-
diction over things, but the appellation" in rem" is unneces-
sary to support the conclusion that jurisdiction is properly 
assumed.s (Williams v. North Carolina (1945) 325 U.S. 226, 
232 [89 L.Ed. 1577, 65 8.Ct. 1092, 157 A.L.R. 1366].)Wil-
liams does hold, however, that due process requires something 
more than mere presence of a party within a jurisdiction 
before that party can invoke the legal process of the forum to 
force an absent spouse to defend her marital status in an 
inconvenient forum and to subvert the policies of other in-
terested jurisdictions in preserving marriages. When the 
forum state is also thc domicile of one of the parties, however, 
its interest and that of its domiciliary justify subordinating 
the conflicting interests of the absent spouse and of any other 
interested jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction to grant annulments has followed an anal-
ogous, but somewhat divergent course. [4] An annulment 
differs conceptually from a divorce in that a divorce termi-
nates a legal status, whereas an annulment establishes that a 
marital status never existed. The absence of a valid marriage 
precluded reliance on the divorce cases in formulating a 
theory of ex parte jurisdiction in annulment, for no res or 
status could be found within the state. (See Comment (1927) 
16 Cal.L.Rev. 38.) The courts, however, did not let jurisdic-
tional concepts of in personam and in rem dictate results in 
annulment actions.· They recognized a state's interest in pro-
viding a forum for some annulment actions even though the 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over one of the parties. 
(Buzzi v. Buzzi (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 823 [205 P.2d 1125] ; 
Bing Gee v. Chan La-i ¥ung Gee (1949) 89 Cal.App.2d 877 
[202 P.2d 360]; Comment, Jurisdiction to Annul (1953) 6 
3Terms such as in rem, quasi in rem, and in personam, seldom solve 
jurisdictional problems and are often a misleading shorthand for the 
result. Such terms in statutes, however, may be invoked in their tradi-
tional meanings to expand or contract jurisdiction. (See, e.g., Code Civ. 
Proc., § 417; Traynor, Is This Oonflict Really Necessary! (1959) 37 
Tex.L.Rev. 657, 662-663; Atkinson v. Superior Oourt (1957) 49 CaI.2d 
338, 344-346 [316 P.2d 960].) 
, 
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Stan.L.Rev. 153.) The crucial question, then, is whether there 
are sufficient factors to justify the court's exercising ex parte 
annulment jurisdiction.4 Although we write on a slate free of 
legislative directives regarding annulment jurisdiction (Mil-
lar v. MiUar, supra, 175 Cal. 797), we are bound by constitu-
tiona I limitations. 
We need not dwell on a resolution of any conflict between 
the interests of California and Maryland. [5] The primary 
issue under the facts of this case is whether due process con-
cepts of fairness to defendant permit plaintiff to choose a 
forum inconvenient to her absent personal jurisdiction over 
her. Although a rule that requires a party who is in Cali-
fornia and who had been fraudulently induced intO a mar-
riage to travel to an inconvenient forum to obtain legal recog-
nition of the nullity of that status works a hardship on that 
party, such a rule is essential to preclude a transient plaintiff 
from choosing a forum that would make defense difficult or 
impossible simply because of physical distance. We find no 
factor here that would justify an exception to the general rule 
requiring personal jurisdiction and thereby shift the burden 
of inconvenience to defendant. [6] The marriage ceremony 
took place elsewhere, defendant lives elsewhere, the matri-
monial domicile was elsewhere, and witnesses are likely to be 
located elsewhere. Although domicile of a plaintiff here would 
afford jurisdiction to award an ex parte annulment,5 plaintiff 
in this case did not plead or prove that he was a domiciliary 
of California when the default judgment was entered. The 
court was therefore without jurisdiction to enter the default 
judgment. 
Since the entry of the judgment, however, defendant has 
appeared in the action. We must therefore determine for 
purposes of proceedings on retrial whether the court may 
award an annulment when both parties are before it, even 
though neither is a domiciliary of the state. 
4See D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the COfI,jlict of Laws: Simons, 
Rosenstiel and Borax, supra, 34 U.ChLL.Rev. 26, 39-40; De1JelopfM'nt8-
Jurisdiction, supra, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 909, 975·976. 
5Buzzi v. Buzzi, supra, 91 Cal.App.2il 823; Bing Gee v. Chan Lai Yung 
Gee, supra, 89 Cal.App.2d 877, 883; Comment, JurisdictiOfl, to .Annul, 
supra, 6 Stan.L.Rev. 153, 155-159; cf. Williams v. North Carolina, supra, 
325 U.S. 226. It is true that" instant" domicile carries a danger of 
fraud on the court of a higher magnituile than does a year's residence 
requirement, which weighs the objective fact of presence more heavily 
than n declared intent. The bona fides of the intent to make permanent a 
California residence can be attacked, however, to provide relief against 
those who would abuse t]le court's jurisdiction. (Crouch v. CT01UJh (1946) 
28 Ca1.2d 243,249 [169 P.2d 897] ; cf. Civ. Code, § 150.2.) 
C) 
\ 
/ 
Nov. 1967] WHEALTON V. WHEALTON 663 
[67 C.2d 656; 63 Cal.Rptr. 291, 432 P.2d 979] 
The primary basis for jurisdiction to resolve disputes be-
tween parties is their presence before the court. Plaintiff in-
itiated this action in the only jurisdiction practically avail-
able to him because of his military service. Although defend-
ant was not within the jurisdiction of the court when the 
default was erroneously entered, she voluntarily appeared 
while the action was before the court. Her appearance was not 
limited to challenging the jurisdiction of the court, but in-
cluded. a request for relief on the merits by way of an answer 
and cross-complaint for separate maintenance. (Judson v. 
Superior Court (1942) 21 Ca1.2d 11, 13 [129 P.2d 361] ; Har-
rington v. Superior Court (1924) 194 Cal. 185, 189 [222 P. 
15] ; Owese v. Justice's Court (1909) 156 Cal. 82, 88 [103 P. 
317].) 
Since both parties are properly before the court, we con-
front the questions whether we may treat the action as a 
transitory cause (see Westerman v. Westerman (1926) 121 
Kan.501 [247 P. 863] ; Avakian v. Avakian (1905, N.J. Ct. of 
Chancery) 69 N.J.Eq. 89, 99 [60 A. 521, 525], affd. 69 N.J.Eq. 
834 [66 A. 1133] ; Storke, A,nnulment in the Conflict of Laws 
(1959) 43 Minn.L.Rev. 849, 852) and whether the interest 
of another state compels us to refuse to hear this cause. 
The rule that domicile is a prerequisite to a valid divorce, 
even when the parties are before the court, may be justified by 
the superior interests of the domiciliary jurisdiction. Such 
jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the status of its 
domiciliaries and the application of its own law in preserving 
or terminating marriages in accord with its social policies. 
(See Development-Jurisdiction, supra, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 909, 
975-976.) When both parties to a divorce action are before the 
court, however, it is questionable whether domicile is an in-
dispensable prerequisite for jurisdiction. If the moving par-
ty'9 mobility is greatly restricted, for instance, access to a 
domiciliary forum may be practically unavailable. (Ibid; D. 
Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, \ 
Rosenstiel and Borax, supra, 34 U.Ohi.L.Rev. 26, 48.) More-
over, when parties secure a divorce without the prerequisite 
domicile in the forum state, it may not be attacked at a later 
date by either of them. (Sutton v. Leib (1952) 342 U.S. 402 
[96 L.Ed. 448, 72 8.0t. 398] ; Cook v. Cook (1951) 342 U.S. 126 
[96 L.Ed. 146, 72 8.0t. 157] ; Johnson v. Muelberger (1951) 
340 U.S. 581 [95 L.Ed. 552, 71 8.0t. 474] ; Coe v. Coe (1948) 
334 U.S. 378 [92 L.Ed. 1451, 68 8.0t. 1094, 1097] ; Sherrer v. 
Sherrer (1948) 334 U.S. 343 [92 L.Ed. 1429, 68 8.Ct. 1087, 1 
i i 
, 
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A.L.R.2d 1355].) Hence, the prerequisite of domicile may be 
casily avoided at the trial by parties wishing to invoke the 
jurisdiction of a court, with little fear in most instances that 
the judgment will be any less effective than if a valid domicile 
in f.act existed. (See Leflar, Conflict of Laws and Farwily Law 
(1960) 14 Ark.L.Rev. 47,51.) 
[7] However valid the rationale for the domicile prerequi-
site may be in divorce actions, it does not apply to annulment 
actions. In divorce actions. the applicable substantive law 
changes as parties change their domicile, but in annulment 
actions courts uniformly apply the law of the state in which 
the marriage was contracted. (Colbert v. Colbert (1946) 28 
CaI.2d 276, 280 [169 P.2d 633]; McDonald v. McDonald 
(1936) 6 Cal.2d 457 [58 P.2d 163, 104 A.L.R. 1292]; Civ. 
Code, § 63; see Storke, Annulment in the Conflict of Laws 
(1959) 43 Minn.L.Rev. 849, 866.) Moreover, no jurisdictional 
bar prevents defendant in this case from continuing to press 
her claim for separa~ maintenance (see Goodwine v. Superior 
Court (1965) 63 CaI.2d 481,483 [47 CaI.Rptr. 201, 407 P.2d 
1]) and plaintiff may defend on the ground that ·no valid 
marriage exists (see Hudson v. H'lldson (1959) 42 CaI.2d 735, 
742 [344 P.2d 295] ; Dimon v. Dimon (1953) 40 Ca1.2d ,516, 
537 [254 P.2d 528] ; DeYoung v. DeYoung (1946) 27 Ca1.2d 
521, 528 [165 P.2d 457] ; Patterson v. Patterson (1947) 82 
Cal.App.2d 838, 842-843 [187 P.2d 118]). We conclude, there-
fore, that the interests of the state of celebration of the mar-
riage or the state of domicile of either party do not preclude a 
court that has personal jurisdiction over both parties from 
entert~ining an annulment action. 
[8] It does not follow that because a court may exercise 
that jurisdiction it must do so in all cases. In the present case 
plaintiff was under a special disability in terms of access to 
any forum other than California.6 Moreover, defendant was 
not caught inadvertently within California, and personal 
jurisdiction was not exercised on a territorial power theory 
but was obtained over defendant through her consent. Hence, 
we -assume that no undue burdens are placed on her by the 
trial of the action in California. In other annulment actions 
where personal jurisdiction is the sole jurisdictional basis, 
however, the doctrine of forum non conveniens might well be 
invoked by one of the parties, or asserted by the court, to 
cause a discretionary dismissal when fairness and the inter-
6Several states considering this disability have enacted legislation per-
mitting servicemen to obtain divorce based on residence. See note 2 myra. 
) 
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ests of judicial administra.tion so demand. (See Developments 
-Jurisdiction, supra, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 909, 968.) 
Plaintiff raises a procedural ground to preclude setting 
aside the judgment. When defendant filed her motion to set 
aside the default judgment and sought to file her cross-com-
plaint for separate maintenance, plaintiff was outside of the 
United States by reason of military orders. His attorney filed 
a request for a stay of proceedings under the Soldiers' and 
Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940.7 That act provides that at 
any stage of any proceeding in which a military person is 
either plaintiff or defendant the court must on his application 
stay the proceedings "unless, in the opinion of the court, the 
ability of plaintiff to prosecute the action or the defendant to 
conduct his defense is not materially affected by his military 
serviee." Plaintiff's attorney urged that because of his ab-
sence due to military service plaintiff could not assist him in 
opposing defendant's efforts to set aside the default judgment 
. or appear as a witness in such further hearings as might be 
held and that the proceedings must therefore be stayed. 
[9] When plaintiff's attorney requested a stay, a default 
judgment ha.d been entered in favor of plaintiff, and defend-
ant had asked to set it aside and also had requested separate 
maintenance. Different considerations are involved in regard 
to each of defendant's requests in ascertaining whether plain-
tiff's ability to prosecute his action is materially affected by 
his military service. The grounds urged for setting aside the 
default jUdgment, the only issue we reach today, were that it 
was premature and that the California court was without 
jurisdiction. Although we have upheld defendant's conten-
tions as to the default judgment, we do not find that plain-
tiff's military service in any way interfered with his ability 
to defend that judgment. The facts-dates of publication and 
actual notice-were not in dispute and were a matter of first-
hand knowledge to his attorney as well as to plaintiff. The 
disputed question was one of law that plaintiff's attorney 
could take charge of without plaintiff's presence. It is there-
T" At any stage thereof any action or proceeding in any court in 
which a person in military service is involved, either as plaintiff or 
defendant, during the period of such service or within sixty days there-
after may, in the discretion of the court in which it is pending, on its 
own motion, and shall, on application to it by such person or some person 
on his behalf, be stayed as provided in this Act unless, in the opinion of 
the court, the ability of plaintiff to prosecute the action or the defendant 
to conduct his defense is not materially affected by reason of his military 
service." (Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U .S.C. 
App. 1521).) 
) 
fore our opinion that plaintiff's prosecution of the case at this 
stage has not been "materially affected by reason of his mili-
tary service." When the case is again before the trial court, 
plaintiff can decide whether to proceed with his action for an 
annulment. If defendant pursues her cross-complaint, plaintiif 
can still request a stay. The trial court will then have an 
opportunity to rule on the request. 
The judgment is reversed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
